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INTRODUCTION
In its opening brief to this Court, the Appellants Stoddarts set out the following five issues
for review:

(1)

$tabtow and Common Law Duties.

A school district is

responsible for breaching its statutory and common law duties to protect the "health
and morals" of its students during school hours even if the resulting injury occurs off
school grounds. Multiple students reported to district personnel that Draper was
planning to cany out a Columbine-style killing.

If the

district negligently

investigated Draper's plan during school hours on school grounds, is the School
District responsible for Draper '.T subsequent murder o f a student offschool grounds
as part of his Columbine plan?
(2)

Statutory and Common Law Duties to Investigate. A school

district is responsible for injuries to its students caused by a third party "if the third
party's actions were the foreseeable result of the school's negligence." A school
district has both statutory and common law duties to make reasonable efforts to
protect its students from the foreseeable misconduct of third parties. Ifthe School

District negligently investigated Drapev fov threatening to murder students, is the
School District responsibJe,forDraper j. subsequent murder of a student?

-
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(3)

Assumed Duty to Investigate. The Idaho Supreme Court has held

that a school district did not assume a duty to provide crossing guards at all
intersections simply by providing crossing guards at some intersections. The duty
assumed was limited to a duty to protect students crossing at those intersections
where the district chose to provide guards. By choosing to investigate a danger

potentially posed by one particular student, does a district assume a duty to
investigate the danger posed by that one student competently?
(4)

Immunity for Employees' Conduct. A school district, absent

"reckless, willful and wanton" conduct, is immune from liability for injuries caused
by persons under its "supervision, custody or care." For purposes of determining
immunity, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that school employees are not under the
"supervision, custody or control" of the district.

If School District

employees

negligently investigated Draper for threatening to murder other students, would the
School District be entitled to immunity in a suit arising out of Draper's subsequent
murder of a student?
(5)

Immunity for Its Students' Conduct. A school district is liable for

injuries caused by persons under its "supervision, custody or care" if the conduct
causing the injuries was "reckless, willful and wanton." Prior to his murder of Cassie
Jo, the School District had received numerous reports that Draper was planning a

-
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Colun~bine-stylekilling. If'the district acted recklessly in,failing to conzpetently

investigate and document Draper's threats of violence, is the district entitled to
immunity in a suit arising out ofDraper S subsequent murder of Cassie Jo?'
In this Reply Brief, the Stoddarts will respond to arguments raised in Respondent School
District's brief in the same order as originally presented in Appellant's Brief. In the final section
of this brief, the Stoddarts will respond to the School District's request for an award ofattorneys fees
and costs.

A.

When a School District Engages in Negligent Conduct On School Grounds and During
School Hours, The District Is Responsible for Harm to Students Caused by its
Negligent Conduct Even if the Harm Occurred OffSchool Grounds (Issue No. 1)
The first issue presented in Stoddart's opening brief,-whether aschool district may be liable

for breach of an existing duty on school grounds if the resulting harm occurs off school grounds, is
not the same issue as "restated" by the School District in its response, - whether a school district has
a duty to protect students from "all foreseeable risks of harm" including those occurring off school
grounds.' The restatement of the issue by the School district is deliberate. As stated by the
Stoddarts, the issue assumes the existence of a duty and breach, ie., "negligent conduct" occurring
on school grounds and then poses the question whether a school district could be responsible for that

'

AppellantS Brie5 pp. 16-17.

School District Brie5 p. 8 ("Did Respondents owe a tort duty to protect Stoddartfrom all
foreseeable risks of harm, including her murder which occurred a$er school hours and offschool
grounds?").

-
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negligent conduct on school grounds if the resulting harm occurred off school grounds. But, as
"restated" by the School District, the issue assumes that some foreseeable harm occurred off school
grounds and then poses the question whether a school district would have any duty to prevent that
harm. In restating the issue as being dependant on where the hann occurred, i.e.,a murder off school
grounds, rather than where the alleged breach occurred, the School District attempts to avoid scrutiny
and responsibility for its conduct on school grounds.

To misdirect this Court away from any analysis of its own conduct, the School District also
suggests in its response brief that the relevant "conduct" is "the conduct of the murder^."^ By stating
the issue in its response brief as whether it is responsible for the conduct of third parties, i.e., "the
murders," acting off school grounds, the School District simply ignores the issue posed by the
Stoddarts. The first issue posed by the Stoddarts on this appeal is whether the School District is
responsible for the harm or injury resulting from it's alleged negligent conduct occurring on school
property even in circumstances where that resulting harm or injury occurs off school p r ~ p e r t y .If~
the School District can be found liable for injuries occurring off school grounds which resull from

'

School Disfricl BrieJ p. 24 ("'B. Respondents Owed Neither a Common Law, Nor a
StafurovyDuty to Contvol the Conduct ofthe Murders Afier School Hours and OffSchool Grounds")
4

Appellant S BrieJ p. 16 ("Ifthe district negligently investigated Draper 'splan during

school hours on school grounds, is the School District responsiblefor Draper 's subsequent murder
ofa student offschool grou~idsaspart of his Columbine plan?).
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its own negligent conduct occurring on school grounds, the District Court's grant of summary
judgment to the School district based upon the contrary must be rever~ed.~
The District Court erroneously relied upon this Court's decision in Rife v. Long to support
its conclusion that a school district has no duty to prevent foreseeable risks of harm to students if
those students' injuries occur off school grounds. The District Court misinterpreted Rife. There, this
Court stated its belief that "the common law duty arose because the parents are not in aposition to

protect their children while they are attending school. Thus, the school district bears the burden
while the children are in its cu~tody."~
Importantly, this Court held "that a school district may be
responsible for negligence occurring during school hours which ultimately results in injury off the
school gro~nds."~
In the present case, the parents of Cassie Jo Stoddart and the parents of all the other students
within the Pocatello School District were not in any position to protect their children from the threat
posed by Brian Draper. Indeed, the parents had no way of knowing that Draper had ever made, or
was ever accused of making, any kind of threat to carry out violence against their school children.
Only the School District possessed that knowledge. Thus, only the School District could have done

R Vol 11, p. 237 ("Thus, the [Supreme] Court has expressly rejected Plaintifs propose
rule that a school district is required to 'prevent the foreseeable risks of harm ' t o students who are
not under the care, custody, andsupervision of the school at the time o f the alleged injury.")

'

Rffe v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,847,908 P.2d 143, 149 (1995).

Id, 127 Idaho at 845,908 P.2d at 147 (citing Brooks v. Logan ("Brooks l"),127 Idaho 484,
484, 903 P.2d 73 (1995)).

-
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anything about it. Being the only one having knowledge of such magnitude, and also knowing that
there was no means by which their students' parents could gain such laowledge, it was the School
District's unequivocal duty to take all reasonable precautions to investigate and resoive the threat.
The School District also cites Rife v. Long for the proposition that "when a student is injured
at a time or place when the district lacks custody or control over the student (i.e.,there is no "special
relationship"); the district owes the student no tort duty of care - even in cases where a foreseeable
injury could re~ult."~Both the District Court and School District ignore the fact that Rife cited

Brook I as the basis for its conclusion "that a school district may be respo~~sible
for negligence
occurring during school hours which ultimately results in injury off the school grounds" when

rejecting the district court's erroneous finding in Rve that the school district had no duty because
the injury occurred off school grounds.' In Rfe, the district court had erroneously granted summary
judgment to the school district based upon its finding that "the statutory duty codified in 1.C. $ 33512(4), did not extend to the circumstances of this case [where a child was injured walking home
from s c h ~ o l ] . 'In
~ other words, Rfe, -contrary to the claims made by the District Court and School

School District Brief; p. 18 (citing R@, 127 Idaho at 845-46; but see, Brook 1, 127 Idaho
at 490 (finding limited duty to warn of suicidal tendencies).
RRife v. Long, 127 Idaho at 845,908 P.2d at 147 (citing Brook v. Logan ("Brooks l"), 127
Idaho 484,484,903P.2d 73 (1995)).
127 Idaho at 845,908 P.2d at 147 (citing Brooks v. Logan ("Brook I"), 127
Idaho 484,484,903 P.2d 73 (1995)).
" Rife V . Long,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 6

District in this case, - and Brooks I stand for the proposition that school district's do have a statutory
duty that can extend to circumstances where injury occurs off school grounds.

Xijk justified its rejection of the district court's conclusion that school district's have no duty
to prevent injuries off school grounds by pointing out that "the operative facts [in Brooks I, 127
Idaho 484, 903 P.2d 73 (1995); Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint School Dist., I 16 Idaho 326,331, 775
P.2d 640,645 (1 989) and Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1138 (1986)l relating to the duty
and breach of duty [all] occurred on school grounds."" Except for the fact that the "injury" in
Brooks Iwas a suicide while the injury in this case was a murder, "the operative facts relating to the
duty and breach of duty occur[ring] on school grounds" are almost identical."
Under the District's rationale, [the School District] would have had aduty to prevent
[Stoddart's murder] if it occurred on school grounds. Conversely, if [slhe had
stepped one foot off school grounds and [been murdered], no duty would arise. We
do not believe this arbitrary line can be drawn. For the purposes of this motion we
must assume that the negligence occurred, if at all, while [Draper] was attending
school . . . l 3
If the School District had a duty to make reasonable efforts to prevent a Columbine style killing on
school grounds, it would be "arbitrary" for this Court to hold that the School District had no duty to
make reasonable efforts to prevent such a killing off school grounds. The School District's attempt
to avoid scrutiny of "the operative facts relating to the [School District's] duty and breach of duty

"

Rife, 127 Idaho at 845,908 P.2d at 147.

l2

Id

" Brooks I, 127 Idaho 484,490,903 P.2d 73,80 (1995)

-
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[that] occurred on school grounds" in this case must be rejected. Both Rtfi and Brooks Imake clear
that the scope of aschool district's duty to prevent foreseeable risks of harm to its students in Idaho
is limited by the time and place of the alleged breach of that duty and not by the time and place of
the alleged injury resulting from that breach.
In its Response Brief, the School District makes two arguments in attempting to distinguish

Brooks I from this case:
( I ) the duty in Brooks I is limited to preventing suicide,I4and

(2) any duty to prevent murder should be limited as the duty in Brooks Iwas limited by I.C.

5 33-512B.I'
Contrary to the School District's argument to the contrary, nothing in Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille

School District #84 "Carrier'?, 142 Idaho 804, 134 P.3d 655, (2006) suggests that the duty
discussed in Brooh I was limited to preventing suicides. In fact, the language from Carrier quoted

l4

School District Brief, p. 25 ("[Ilt is Respondents' position that the duly of care
announced in Brooks I has been limited to only the spectfic circumstances where a school district
possesses some knowledge of a student's intent to commit suicide, and this duty should not be
extended to other circuinstances where one student harms another after school hours and offschool
grounds")

' School District Briex p. 28 ("Based on tlze coizsiderations identified by the Court in
Curlpier, any tort duty imposed on a school district exposing it to liability for injuries to students
which occur a$er school hours and offschool grounds must be a very narrow one that can only be
triggered when a school district receives "direct evidence" o f a student's '>resent aim, direction
or trend toward the taking of [another's] l@.") (citing Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School District
#84, 142 Idaho 804, 809, 134 P.3d 655, 660 (2006)).

-

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF Page 8

by the School District in its response brief can only be interpreted as holding that the Brooks Iduty
is not "limited" to the duty to prevent ~ u i c i d e . ' ~
In Brooks I, this Court found that I.C. 3 33-51 2(4) created a duty in school districts
"to act affirmatively to prevent foreseeable harm to its students. This duty extends
to the prevention of suicide.I7
"Suicide" is thus only one "foreseeable harm to its students" that school districts must "act
affirmatively to prevent." The School District provides no possible reason for concluding that any
duty extending to the prevention of suicide would not necessarily extend to the prevention of murder.
Finally, the fact that this Court cited Brooks I in Rge as grounds for rejecting the district court's
erroneous finding that "the statutory duty codified in I.C.

3

33-512(4), did not extend to the

circumstances of this case [where a child was injured walking home from school]" conclusively
establishes that the duty announced in Brooks I is not limited to preventing suicide."
Then, in what must be considered amost extraordinary argument, the School District asks this
Court to limit the duty of school districts as codified in I.C. 3 33-5 12(4) to prevent the murder of their
students in the same way that the Idaho Legislature by enacting I.C. § 33-512B had limited the duty

l6

School District Brief, p. 25, fn 8.

l7

Carrier, 142 Idaho at 808, 134 P.3d at 659 (citations onzmitteted).

Rye v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 845, 908 P.2d 143, 147 (1995) (citing Brooks v. Logan
("Brooks P'), 127 Idaho 484,484,903 P.2d 73 (1995)).
"

-
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of school districts to prevent the suicide of their student^.'^ Apparently the School District is not
bothered by the fact that, when enacting I.C. 5 33-512B, the Idaho Legislature choose not to limit any
duties arising under LC. 5 33-512(4) other than the duty to warn of "suicidal tendencies." Instead of
taking their arguments to the Legislature for the enactment of a similar statute limiting their duties
to prevent murder, the School District has decided to ask this Court to make such legislation from
the Bench.
In Carrier, this Court was called upon to decide whether "suicidal tendencies" as the term
appears in I.C. 5 33-512B should be construed as imposinga broad or nerrow duty on school districts
to warn." To address this issue of statutory construction, the Court "turn[ed] first to the legislative
history of1.C. 5 33-5128 and then examine[d] the policy considerations."" Because this Court found
that the "the Legislature [had] adopted I.C. 5 33-512B specifically to narrow the duty of a teacher to
warn of suicidal tendencies," the Court held that "the Legislature intended the term 'suicidal

School District Brief, p. 28 ("Based on the considerations identified by the Court in
Carrier, any tort duty imposed on a school district exposing it to liability,for injuries to students
which occur after school hours and offschool grounds must be a very narrow one that can only be
triggered when a school district receives "divect evidence" o f a student S '>resent aim, direction
or trend towavdthe taking of [another 's] lye.") (citing Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School District
#84, 142 Idaho 804,809,134 P.3d 655,660 (2006))
l9

Carrier, 142 Idaho at 808,134 P.3d at.659 ("'[T]endency' can have broad meaning
including apattern ofpast conduct or occuwence or it can have a more narrow meaning including
only a specific present or future aim")
20

21

Id.

-
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tendencies' in I.C. (i 33-512B to mean a present aim, direction or trend toward taking one's own

The School District's argument that, - because this Court in Carrier held that the Legislature
in enacting I.C. 33-512B intended "to narrow the duty of a teacher to warn of suicidal tendei~cies,"
-this Court should, without waiting for the Legislature to act, now act unilaterally to narrow the duty
codified in I.C. § 33-512(4) in circumstances unrelated to suicide is indeed extraordinary. The Court
in Carrier reaffirmed that I.C. 33-512(4) requires school districts "to act affirmatively to prevent
foreseeable harm to its students" and, in all circu~nstancesother than suicide, that duty remains
unchanged by the enactment of LC. $ 33-512B.23 If the School District wants to limit the duty
codified in I.C. § 33-512(4) in circumstances unrelated to suicide, it must take its argument to the
Idaho Legislature. It is "most extraordinary" for such an argument to be brought before any court.

B.

A School District Has a Duty to Take Reasonable Action to Prevent Harm to Its
Students Caused by the ReasonabIy Foreseeable Conduct of a Third Party OssueNo. 2)

In the next section of its brief, the School District argues that "because [the School District]
lacked custody or control over Stoddart at the time ojher murder, they owed no duty of care to protect
her from any

The School District returns to its primary defense in this case by once again

22

Carrier, 142 Idaho at 808 and 809,134 P.3d at 659,660, respectively.

23

Currier, 142 Idaho at 808, 134 P.3d at 659 (citations omitted).

24 School District Brief; p. 32 (citing Summers v. Cambridge Joint School District, 139 Idaho
953, 956,88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004); Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 847,908 P.2d 143, 149 (1995)
(emphasis added))
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asserting that it cannot be liable for injuries occurring off school grounds after school hours. As
authority for this proposition, the School District cites two Idaho cases: Summers v. Cambridge Joint

School District, 139 Idaho 953,956,88 P.3d 772,775 (2004), and Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,847,
908 P.2d 143, 149 (1995).25 But, as discussed in the preceding section, Rifi actually stands for the
converse. Rife cited Brooks Ias the basis for its conclusion "that a school district may be responsible
for negligence occurring during school hours which ultimately results in injury off the school
grounds" as this Court's reason for rejecting the district court's erroneous conclusion that the school
district in Rife had no duty when the injury occurred off school grounds.26In Rife, the injury occurred
after school hours and off school grounds while the plaintiff was walking home from scho01.~' The
Court's holding that the school district in Rife had no duty to supervise students while walking home
after school had nothing to do with where the "injury" occurred, but, everything to do with where the
alleged "breach"

The Stoddarfs, - unlike the plaintiffs in Rife, - alleged that the School

District breached its duty to Cassie Jo Stoddart when it investigated Draper on school grounds during

'"Rife, 127 Idaho at 845,908 P.2d at 147 (citing Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484,484,903
P.2d 73 (1995)).
Rife, 127 Idaho at 843, 908 P.2d at 145.
Rife, 127 Idaho at 845-846,908 P.2d at 147-148 ("Wefindno indication that the statutory
duty imposed by LC. $33-512(4) was adopted in order to extend the duty of the school districts to
supervise students while traveling home").
28

-
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school hours, aduty that the School District admits it owed to its students by statute and common law,
in its Response
In the other case cited by the School District as authority for its argument that the School
District owed no duty to Cassie Jo Stoddart because she was murdered off school grounds, Summers
v. Cambridge.Joint School District, 139 Idaho 953,88 P.3d 772, (2004), this Court held that the duty

to supervise children after school only "continues until the school bus driver deposits them in a safe
pla~e."'~
Again, the holding for the school district in Summers had nothing to do with where the
"injury" occurred, but, everything to do with where the alleged "breach" occurred. According to the
Court,
When the school bus driver drove away, Ryan had not left the area of safety, twenty
feet away from the highway, and was still in his own driveway. Ryan had been
deposited into an area of safety. At that point, the school bus driver and the school
district no longer had Ryan under their control and custody. Neither the school district
nor the school bus driver owed any further duty to Ryan summer^.^'
The Stoddarts have not claimed that the School District breached its duty by not protecting Cassie Jo
after she left school. Instead, the School District is alleged to have breached its duty to Cassie Jo

29 School District BrieJ; p. 34 ("First, by investigating Draper back in the spring of 2004, the
District was merely satisfying its general duty of care under common law and pursuant to I.C. $33512(4) to take reasonable steps to protect the students in its custody from harm.")

O'

Summers v. Cambridge Joint School District, 139 Idaho 953,956,88 P.3d 772,775 (2004)

" Summers, 139 Idaho at 956,88 P.3d at775.
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when investigating one of its students, Brian Draper, on school grounds during school hours for
alleged threats of violence he had made against other students.
Although Draper was a "third party" to the special relationship between the School District
and Cassie Jo as a student in the District, Draper was also a studeilt in the District. As discussed
above, the third parties who actually caused plaintiff's

injuries in Rife and Summers had no

relationship with the school districts. The third parties causing the injuries in Rife and Summers were
members of the general public. In each of these cases, the relationship giving rise to the duty allegedly
breached was the relationship between the injured plaintiff student and the school district. The
alleged duty was a duty to protect the plaintiff students from foreseeable harm even if that harm
resulted from the conduct ofthird parties over which the school districts had no control. The common
law obligations of a school district to protect its students related to injuries caused by third parties was
recently addressed by the Court.
[Slchools are obligated to exercise due care and take reasonable precautions to protect
their students. See Doe v. Durtschi, l I0 Idaho 466,472 (1986) ("[Tlhe school district
had a statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to protect its students from. . . danger.
A breach of that duty constitutes negligence."). The school's duty includes
"anticipat[ing] reasonably foreseeable dangers and [taking] precautions protecting the
child in its custody from such dangers." For that reason, "the fact that injuries were
caused by a third party does not absolve [a] school district from liability for its
negligence if the third party's actions were the foreseeable result of the school's
negligen~e."~~

SIzerer v. Pocatello School District No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 491, 148 P.3d 1232, 1237
(2006) (quoting Bauer v. MinidokaSch. Dist. No. 331,116 Idaho 586,590 (1989); Doe v. Durtschi,
110 Idaho 466,472-73,716 P.2d 1232,1244-45 (1986)).
32
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In Doe v Duvfssrhi, this Court held a school district liable for the sexual assaults of students by a
teacher because the teacher's "actions were the foreseeable result of the school district's alleged
failure to exercise due care to protect its students."33 The Court noted that the children's injuries in

Durtschi "were the foreseeable consequence of the school district's negligence in retaining Durtschi
despite full knowledge of his pro~livities."'~In both Sherer and Durtschi, -like was the case in Rjfe
and Summers, -the duty allegedly breached was the duty to protect a student which arose directly
from the relationship between a student and a school district. In each of these cases, however
plaintiffs injuries resulting from the conduct of some third party were proximately caused by the
school district's alleged breach of its duty to the plaintiff.
Specifically arguing in its response brief that it is not responsible for the foreseeable harm
resulting from the conduct of "third parties," the School District relies primarily on two cases: Merritt
v. State of Idaho, 108 Idaho 20,696 P.2d 871 (1985) and Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416,835

P.2d 651 (Ct App. 1992).35 In its response, the School District cites Merritt ,Rtfi and Litchfield for
the legal assertion "that one owes no tort duty to protect another from harm caused by a third person
unless he possessed actual custody and control over the injured person at the time of the harm."36 In

3'

Doe v. Durtschi, 1 1 0 Idaho 466, 472,716 P.2d 1238, 1244 (1986).

l4

Doe v. Duvtschi, 110 Idaho at 471, 716 P.2d at 1243.

l5

School District Brief; p. 20.
Id.
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citing to Rife, the School District once again mis-characterizes its holding as "no duty to protect
where no custody and control at time of injury."37 And furthermore, Merritt actually supports the
Stoddarts' claim against the School District for failing to protect Cassie Jo Stoddart from threats of
violence made by Draper against other students in the district.
One who is required by law to assume the custody of another so as to deprive him of
his normal power of self-protection or to subject him with association with persons
liltely to harm him, has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect him from harm.)'
First, Merritt has nothing to do with where the "injury" occurs. The issue was whether the plaintiff
was in the custody of the Bonner County jail or the Department of Health & Welfare at the time of
her assault.39Because the Court found her to be in the custody and control of the Bonner County jail
rather than Health & Welfare, Bonner County was responsible for protecting her from harm caused
by her "association with persons likely to harm [her]."40 Although Merritt does support holding
school districts liable for not protecting their students from foreseeable hann, Merritt should not be
read as requiring "custody and control over the third party at the time of the alleged harm." because
both the breach, i.e., failure to protect, and resulting "harm" in Merritt occurred while the victim was

37

Id. (citing Rife, 127 Idaho at 845-846) (Emphasis added)

Mer~ittv, State ofldnho, 108 Idaho 20,24,696 P.2d 871,875 (1985) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts §$314A and 320 (1965).
38

40

Merritt, 108 Idaho at 24,696 P.2d at 875 (1985)
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still in the Bonner County jail." Rather, because Bonner County assumed custody and control over
the plaintiff in Merritt, Bonner County had a duty to protect her from foreseeable harm caused by
third parties regardless of whether such third parties were or were not in its custody or control.

he School District also cites Litchfield v. Nelsoil, 122 ldallo 416,420,835 P.2d 65 1,655 (Ct
App. 1992) as support for its argument that "one owes no tort duty [to] control the conduct of a third
person to prevent him from causing harm to another absent the requisite custody and control over the

thirdparty at the time of the alleged harm.42Here, in contrast with the other cases we have discussed,
plaintiffs, the Litchfields, were members of the traveling public having no special relationship with
the defendant, Bonner County.43 Instead, the Litchfields were injured when their automobile was
struck by an automobile driven by an intoxicated driver who they alleged had been negligently
released from jail b y ~ o n n e C0unty.4~
r
The duty allegedly breached in Litchjeld was a duty owed
to the traveling pubic that allegedly arose from the relationship between the defendant, Bonner
County, and the intoxicated driver who injured the Litchfields subsequent to his being released from
the Bonner County jail.
[Olur Supreme Court in Sterling v. Bloom, held that a probation officer owed a duty
of care to individual members of the traveling public foreseeably endangered by the

4'

School Disln'ct BrieA p. 20 ("emphasis in original")

42

School District BrieA p. 20 ("emphasis in original")

43

Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416,419, 835 P.2d 65 1,654 (Ct App. 1992)

44

Id.
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officer's negligent supervision of a probationer. As specifically noted by the Court,
the key to this duty is the relationship between the supervisor and the supervisee. "In
the absence of a requisite relationship there generally is no duty to protect others
against harm from third person^."^'
Because Cassie Jo Stoddart was a member of the public, - in addition to being a student in the School
District, - the duty to protect the public discussed in Sterlingand Litchfieldwould apply to her. But,
because Cassie Jo Stoddart was also a student in the District, the School District also had a duty to
protect her independent of the Sterling/Litcl?field duty.
But, regardless of whether one is addressing the duty to protect students from foreseeable
harm caused by third parties, i e . , the duty in Durtschi, Summers and Rife, or the duty to protect the
public from the harm caused by those under the defendants' custody or control, i e . , the duty in
Sterling and Litchfield, issues related to the sufficiency of the defendants' "custody and control"
should be determined at the time of the alleged breach and not at the time of injury. Because the
School District had "custody and control" over the third party at the time of the breach, i. e., custody
and control over Draper when investigating his threats, the School District is responsible for
breaching its duty to the public, including Cassie Jo Stoddart, in this case. As discussed below, the
School District's assertion that custody and control must be assessed at the time of the injury is not
supported by Litchfield. 46
Litchfield, 122 Idaho at 420, 835 P.2d at 655 (quoting Sterling v. Bloom, 1 1 Idaho 21 1,
225, 723 P.2d 755,759 (1986)) (emphasis added))
45

School District Brief; p. 20 ("[Olne owes no tort duty to protect [to] control the conduct
of a third person to prevent him from causing harm to another absent the requisite custody and
46
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The Court of Appeals in Litchfield addressed the issue as follows:
Idaho adheres to the general rule that one does not have a duty to control the conduct
of another. . . . However, civil liability may be imposed under an exception where a
"special relationsl~ip"exists. Such arelationship may be custodial in nature, requiring
the defendant to control his charge and to guard other persons against his dangerous
propen~ities.~~
Clearly, at the time of the investigation, the relationship between the School District and Draper was
"custodial," at least as custodial as the relationship between a probation officer and his probationer
discussed in Sterling v. Bloom."

And, despite the School District's argument to the contrary, the

Court of Appeals in Litchfieldnever held that actual custody and control over the third party "at the
time of the alleged harm" is required for a "special relationship" to exist." In fact, the Court of
Appeals felt compelled to explicitly note that it was not reviewing the legal principles as contained
in the jury instructions in Litchfield because neither side had objected to either the instructions or the
verdict form submitted to the jury.5o Custody and control over the third party is required to establish
the duty allegedly breached by a defendant's failure to control the conduct of that third party. Once
the duty to control a third party has been breached by a defendant, there is no authority cited by the

control over the third party at the time of the alleged harm") (citing Lifchfield, 122 Idaho at 420)
n7'

Litchfield, 122 Idaho at 420, 835 P.2d at 655 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)

48

la:

49

School District Brief; p. 20

Litchfield, 122 Idaho at 421,835 P.2d at 656, fn 3 ("Our reviewfocusessolely on whether
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict under the instructions given")
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School District requiring the harm or injury resulting from that breach to occur while that third party
is still in the custody and control of the defendant. In fact, all the authority cited by the School
District suggests the opposite.
Finally, the School District cites Coonse v Boise School District, 132 Idaho 803, 979 P.2d
1161 (1999) "as the closest analogous case" to the case at bar.*' According to the School District, the
Stoddarts, similar to the plaintiffs in Coonse, are arguing "distinctions without a differen~e."'~111

Coonse, this Court rejected the argument that, -because plaintiffs' had alleged that the school district
had negligently supervised the student victim rather than the student victimizers, - the immunity
provided the school district by LC. 3 6-904A(2) should not apply.53 But, the Stoddarts have never
argued that the School District breached its duty to supervise the victim in this case, Cassie Jo
Stoddart, as was alleged in Coonse. Instead, the Stoddarts alleged that the School District breached
its duty to protect Cassie Jo Stoddart when it negligently investigated Brian Draper on school property
during school hours for threats of violence. And, because there are no facts alleged in Coonse
"analogous" to the School District's investigation into Draper's documented threats to carry oul a
Coluinbine killing, Coonse is simply not applicable to the issue of immunity in this case. The issue
of immunity will be discussed in Section F below.

School District, p. 31
"

Id.

'' Coonse v. Boise School District, 132 Idaho 803,806,979 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1999)
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C.

By Investigating Draper as a Potential Threat, the District Assumed a Duty to
Investigate Draper CompetentIy (Issue No. 3)
In its response, the School District claims that it could not have "assumed" a duty to

investigate Draper competently in the spring of 2004 because, when the District did investigate
Draper in 2004, "the district was merely satisfying its existing duty of care under the common law
and pursuant to I.C.

3 33-512(4) to take reasonable steps to protect the students in its custody from

The District then asserts that it "easily satisfied the general duty of care it owed to its
students in 2004, when it promptly and thoroughly responded to the allegations Nix had leveled
against Draper by involving the Pocatello Police Department, by interviewing and disciplining student
Christopher Nix, and by interviewing Draper and his

Here, the School District admits that

it was required to investigate Draper's alleged threats ofviolence in 2004 to "satisf[y] its existing duty
of care under the common law and pursuant to I.C. 3 33-5 12(4) to take reasonable steps to protect the
students in its custody from harm," but claims that "it did not breach that existing duty because "it
promptly and thoroughly responded" to those alleged threat^.'^ The School District's description of
its investigation as "thorough" and "easily satisqying]" its duty clearly relies upon its erroneous
argument that, while it owed a duty to investigate, it was not required to do so competently. Because

School District Brief; p. 34 (citing Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho, 389,34 P.3rd 1069,
1072 (2001) ("it is possible to create a duty where one previously did not exist").
54

"

id.

56

id.
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the School District here admits that it had both a common law and statutoly duty to investigate
Draper's threats ofviolence in 2004, this Court must reject the District's contradictory arguments that
it owed no duty."
The School District's argument that, despite admitting that it had a "general" duty to
investigate threats to its students, it had no "specific duty to conduct research or investigation for the
purposes of protecting its students from foreseeable risks of harm which occur off school property,"
is n o n s e n ~ i c a l .Deciding
~~
whether a defendant owes a duty is entirely different from deciding
whether any breach of that defendant's duty occurredor whether it proximately caused the plaintiffs
injury. While the questions of "when" and "where" an injury occurs may raise issues related to
causation, the School District's attempt to import such considerations into an analysis of duty is
without legal precedent.
Based upon the District's admission that it had a duty to investigate Draper, the relevant issue
becomes one of breach, i e., whether the steps taken by the School District were "reasonable" and the
investigation it conducted was "thorough:

rather than one of duty. The School District never raised

57

See e.g., School District Brief; p. l("The Respondent School District did not owe a duty
ofcare under the circumstances requiring it to take steps toprevent Stoddart's murder"), p. 30 ("The
District Court'spnding that Respondents owed no tort duty of care under the circumstances, and
its grant of summary judgment against Appellants on the issue of liability should therefore by
affirmed."), p. 46 ("Regarding investigations, Respondents did not owe a tort duty ofcare to conduct
a competent investigation ofthe information regarding Draper it had allegedly receivedprior to
Sfoddart's murderfor the purpose of discovering additional information which could have possibly
made it foreseeable that Draper and Adamcik would murder Stoddart").
58

School District Brief; p. 34 (citing Martin, 138 Idaho at 150)
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the issue of breach of duty when moving for summary judgment - instead arguing that it owed no
duty, or, in the alternative, that it was entitled to immunityz9- and therefore cannot prevail on
appeal by claiming that its investigation of Draper was in fact reasonable and thorough. Because the
issue was never raised below it should not be considered by this Court on appeal because the
Stoddarts never had the opportunity to present affidavits or argument in opposition. Moreover, the
reasonableness and thoroughness of that investigation is a question of fact for the jury and not a
proper issue to consider on summary judgment.
Although the relevant issue is one of breach rather than one of duty, determining the limits
of that duty allegedly breached by the School District will be necessary when addressing the issue of
breach. If this Court decides to address the issue of breach -despite the existence of fact questions
that would have to bedecided, and despite the fact that the issue was not raised below- the question
shifts from whether a duty existed to what the limits of that duty are. As discussed in the Stoddart's
opening brief, the District Court mis-characterized the issue of whether the School District assumed
a duty to Cassie Jo Stoddart when it initiated its investigation &Draper in 2004 as whether the School
District assumed a duty to Draper when it investigated him in 2004.60For this reason, it appears that
the District Court never addressed the issue of whether the School District assumed a duty to protect
Cassie Jo Stoddart.

59

School District Brief, p. 1.

60

Appellant's Brief, p. 27.
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In its response, the School District never further addresses the issue of whether it voluntarily
assumed a duty when it initiated its investigation into Draper's threats of violence in 2004.6' When
arguing for immunity pursuant to LC, j' 6-904A(2), the School District fails to recognize that, in
initiating the investigation of Draper, it voluntarily assumed a duty outside the scope of the immuility
protection provided by 1C. $ 6-904A(2). Instead, the School District cites Rees v. Idaho, Dept. of

Health & Welfare, 143 Idaho 10,15,137 P.3d 397 (2006) as support for its assertion that the "public
duty rule" provides "that a governmental entity owes no duty to conduct a competent investigation
to protect another from harm except under a specific statute. . ."62 In other words, the School
District admits in its brief that as part of the duty of care it owed it was required to perfom an
investigatio~lof Draper, but the District then argues it could satisfy that duty of care even by carelessly
or recklessly conducting the required investigation. Certainly, the law does not support such an
absurd standard.

Rees is inapposite because there was no other duty owed by the governmental agency to the
plaintiff.63 If another duty existed then the inquiry of the "public duty" would not have been
necessary. Second, this Court relied upon factors set forth in the Minnesota case of Radke v. County

6'

School District Brief; pp. 34-38
School District Brief, p. 35 (emphasis in original).

63

Rees, 143 Idaho at 15, 137 P.3d at 402.
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~fFreeborn,694 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 2005).64This Court parenthetically described Radke as "noting
the 'public duty rule' requires a governmental unit 'owe the plaintiff a duty different from that owed
to the general public in order for the governmental unit to be found liable'."65 The School District
in this case admits that it owed a common law and statutory duty to Cassie Jo Stoddart pursuant to
Idaho Code $ 33-512(4), a duty that is not owed to the general public. Therefore, the "public duty
rule" does not relieve the District from conducting a "competent" investigation.
The Court in Rees analyzed the Idaho Child Protection Act ("ICPA") to eventually hold that
the Dept. of Health and its agents "owed to Tegan [the murdered child] a duty to competently
investigate the reported child abuse because of the special relationship created once the report of
suspected abuse was received" by the De~artment.6~
Then, after determining that "under the [Idaho
Tort Claims Act] liability is the rule and immunity is the exception," the Court concluded that the
Rees defendants were not entitled to imm~nity.6~
But, because the issue,of assumed duty was never
addressed in Rees, the School District has not offered this Court any argument opposing the existence
of the assumed duty argued in Section D of the Stoddart's opening brief!'

Therefore, regardless of

64

Id., 143 Idaho at 16, 137 P.3d at 403.

65

Id.

6G

Rees v. Idaho, Dept. of Health & Welfare, I43 Idaho I0,20, 137 P.3d 397,406 (2006)

Id,, 143 Idaho at 406-407, I37 P.3 at 19-20 (citing Sterling v. Bloonz, 11 1 Idaho 2 1 1,214,
723 P.2d 755,758 (1986)).
67

68

Appellant's Brief, pp. 27-30.
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any common law or statutory duty of school districts to investigate threats of violence, in initiating
its investigation of Draper formaking specific threats in 2004, the School District assumed a duty to
investigate Draper competently on at least this one particular occasion.

3.

TheDistrictHs Not Entitled to Hmmunity Because the H a m was not Caused by a Person
Under the District's "Supervision" (Issue No. 4)
The School District argues that it is entitled to immunity pursuant to LC. $6-904A(2) for its

alleged negligent investigation of Draper's threats of violence because any difference between
investigate and supervise "is aquintessential 'distinction without adifferen~e."'~~
The School District
correctly points out that the Stoddarts do claim that there is a significant difference between the
"supervision" of students at school for which immunity may apply and the "investigation" of a
particular student at school for threatening to carry out a Columbine killing for which immunity
would not apply.70 AS discussed above, the School District did "investigate" Draper's threats of
violence and, in doing so, voluntarily assumed a duty to investigate those threats competently. No
immunity protects the School District from liability for its breach of such a duty. The Stoddarts
contend that the immunity provision of I.C.

5 6-904A(2) is not applicable here because there is a

difference between the school's "supervision" of students and the school's "investigation" of a
particular student. Thus, LC. § 6-904A(2) immunityshould only apply here if this Court were to hold

69

School Dislrict BrieJ p. 39.

O'

School Di~tvictBrieJ p. 38.
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that there is no difference between "Arises out of an injury. . by a person under supervision . . . " and
"Arises out of an injury. . by a person under [investigation] . . . ".7'
When deciding whether to deny recovery to achild injured by the allegedly negligent conduct
of an agent of the defendant school district based upoil LC. 5 6-$04A(2) immunity, ie., "claim that
the school district failed to properly supervise [its agent] Cliffhanger," this Court explicitly rejected
any broad interpretation of "supervision" based upon the purpose of section 6-904A.72
The application of section 6-904A to the claim that the school district failed to proerly
supervise Cliffhanger depends on whether Cliffhanger was "under supervision,
custody or care" of the school district within the meaning of the statute. Broadly
interpreted, this phrase could be construed to include all employees or other persons
acting on behalf of the government. However, if liability is to be the rule and
immunity the exception, this language should be given a construction that avoids
undoing section 6-904A's creation of a right to recover against the state for its
negligence.
The purpose of section 6-904A was to "render the state immune from the
unpredictable acts of thivdpersons . . ..""
Furthermore, because the purpose of section 6-904A is only to render the state immune from the
"unpredictable" acts of third persons, that purpose would not be advanced by construing this section
so as to render the state immune from the allegedly "predictable" acts of third parties. Such an
interpretation would "undo[] section 6-904A's creation of a right to recover against the state for its

72

Skerer v. Pocatello School District No. 25, 143 Idaho 486,492, 148 P.3d 1232, 1238

73

id (Citations omitted)

(2006)

-

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF Page 27

negligence" by making immunity the rule rather than the exception Tor all acts of students, whether
those acts were predictable or not.
To "supervise" a student is "to direct and watch over the work and performance o f ' a
student.14 To "investigate" a student, on the other hand, is "to observe or inquire into [a student] in
detail."7s It cannot be disputed that, although the School District did direct and watch over the work
and performance o f ' all its students, including Draper, it attempted to "observe and inquire into [two
particular students, Draper and Nix] in detail" based upon their reported threats to commit a
Columbine killing. Nor can it be disputed that Draper and Nix were picked out from all the other
students who were only under supervision by the School District for observation and inquiry "in
detail" based upon their alleged threats of violence. In fact, the sole purpose for the School District's
"in detail" inquiry into Draper and Nix was to "predict" which, if either, student posed a foreseeable
risk of harm to the other students. If, based upon its investigations into the threats, the School District
negligently predicted that Nix, but not Draper, posed a foreseeable threat to others, the subsequent
murder of Cassie Jo stoddart by Draper cannot be deemed to have just been "the unpredictable act[]
of' Draper.76

74

Webster 's II New College Dictionary, 1 107 (1999)

75

Webster 's II New College Dictionary, 583 (1999)

76

Sherer, 143 Idaho at 492, 148 P.3d at 1238.
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Analogous to this Court's refusal to provide immunity to the school district in Durtschi for
negligently retaining a teacher known to have sexually abused children, this Court should refuse to
apply the immunity found in LC. $6-904A(2) because the "very risk which constituted the district's
negligence was the probability that such actions might occur.""

In retaining Draper in the school

system after being told by Nix that Draper was planning to carry out a Columbine killing, the School
District was more than negligent, it was recltless. This was no failure in the District's "supervision"
of its students, but instead, it was a failure in the District's "investigation" of a student who the
District had been told was planning to carry out a Columbine killing, and a failure to take appropriate
affirmative action to protect its students from the foreseeable risk of harm posed by Draper. The
District is not entitled to immunity for its negligent investigation of Draper and subsequent failure
to take appropriate action when Draper student subsequently murders Cassie Jo Stoddart as part of
that plan.

E.

The School District Is Not Entitled to Immunity Because the District's Investigation into
Draper's Threats Was Reckless (Issue No. 5)
The District Court held that immunity pursuant to I.C. $6-904A(2) is not applicable to the

School District's investigation of Draper's threats. Neither party has appealed that conclusion, and
it should therefore stand. However, even if this Court were to take up the non-appealed issue and
hold, as argued by the School District, that the immunity statute is implicated in this case, the School

"

Rees, 143 Idaho at 20, 137 P.3d at 407 (quoting Durtschi, 110 Idaho at 472,716 P.2d at

1244).
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District would still be liable for the wrongful death of Cassie Jo Stodda~fbecause the District's
investigation of Draper was "reckless." In its response, the School District argues that "there is not
a scintilla of evidence in support of this allegation [of recklessness] and it therefore fails as a matter
of law."78The School Oistrict argues that the only evidence capable of supporting the allegations of
recklessness would be "evidence which would cause one to reasonably conclude that [the School
District] knew that Draper and Adamcik were obviously about to commit a heinous murder."79
According to the School District, the Stoddart's argument "fails because as a matter of law because
they have failed to demonstrate the requisite level of the foreseeability of the specific harm (the
murder of Stoddart) required to find that reckless, willful and wanton conduct existed which would
take [the School District] outside the immunity under the Actxgo In its response, the District
complains that "[alt no time has anyone said: 'Of course, we know those boys were going to kill
Stoddart and a few others if they could. It was obvious those boys were

Although it is

undisputed that no one told the District's agents that Draper was going to specifically murder Cassie
Jo Stoddart, the District is dead wrong in its argument that prior knowledge of the identity of a

School District Brief; p. 40.
79

School District Brief; p. 43.

School District Briei p. 40 (emphasis in original) (citing Harris v. Idaho Dept. OfHeallh
and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,299,847 P.2d 1156 (1 992))
"

School District Brief; p. 43.
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specific intended victim is required for a Plaintiff to establish liability and avoid the application of
the immunity statute.
The School District's flawed argument. appears to be based primarily upon its
misunderstanding of Harris v. Idaho Dept. Of Health and Welfare, 123 Ida110 295, 847 ?.2d 1156
(1 992).82The "specific harm" identified in Harris that the Court found not to be sufficiently "manifest

and ostensible, and likely to occur" so as to make the defendant's conduct in the Harris case
"reckless" was nothing more specific than just "~iolence."~~
This foreseeability [necessary to a determination of recltlessness], as applied to this
case, contemplates more than the mere possibility of aggressive tendencies harbored
by the state'; ward. The concept of foreseeability is much more narrowly drawn in
this circumstance. The specific harm, i.e., violence, particular of a sexual nature,
toward members of the public other than Barajas's peers must be manifest or
ostensible, and highly likely to occur.84
This Court in Harris never suggested that the State would be entitled to immunity if it did not know
the identity of the subsequent victim or the specifics of the violence.
A comparison of the facts available to the State in Harris to those available to the School

District here shows that, at a minimum, there is an issue of fact as to whether the School District was
reckless in its handling ofDraper's threats of violence. The assailant of the plaintiff in Harris, Adrian

82

Id.

Harris v. Idaho Dept. OfHealth and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,299,847 P.2d 1156 (1992).
84

id
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Rarajas and Brian Draper were both juveniles.8s Barjas was subsequently "convicted of two counts
of infanlous crime against nature, one count ofrape, one count of grand theft, and one count of second
degree burglary, all perpetrated against Harris, an elderly widow" and Draper was convicted of the
murder of a fellow Pocatello High School student, Cassie Jo S t ~ d d a r t . ~ ~
Prior to the assault on Harris, Barajas's criminal record included four misdemeanors,
three involving petit theft and one misdemeanor battery. There were no prior
incidents involving sexual misconduct, violent aggression, or any felony. The battery
resulted from blooding the nose of another boy in a fistfight. . . . Subsequent to
Barajas's commitment to the custody ofthe state, the Department interviewed Barajas
and family members, did an intake evaluation, completed a psychological evaluation
of Barajas, conducted a staff conference to consider treatment and placement options
. . . The evaluations performed on Barajas revealed his angry nature and proclivity to
aggression, and diagnosed the possibility that he might pose an above average sexual
threat to his "sexual peers" due to his past sexual abuse . . .87
The Court in Harris then held that "no act or omission of the entployees involved a high degree of
probability that the kind of harm [i.e., "violence, particular of a sexual nature, toward members of the
public other than Barajas's peers] which Harris suffered would result tl~erefrom."'~In contrast to the
facts in Harris, the ~ c h o oDistrict
l
was told on two separate occasions prior to the murder of Cassie
Jo Stoddart that Brian Draper was planing to carry out a Columbine School killing. Furthermore, the
record shows that, when Draper subsequently murdered Cassie Jo Stoddart, he did so as part of his

85,

Harris, 123 Idaho at 296.

"

Id.

87

Harris, 123 Idaho at 297

88

Harris, 123 Idaho at 299

-
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plan to commit acolumbine killing. And unlike poor Mrs. Harris, based upon the information known
to the School District, Cassie Jo Stoddart was a member of the class of persons to whom Brian Draper
posed a specific threat of violence.
If the District's failure to competently and fully investigate specific reports that Draper was
pla~~ning
a Columbine killing, a plan that Draper subsequently initiated when he and Adamcik killed
Cassie Jo Stoddart, does not at least create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the School
District acted "recklessly," it is hard to imagine any set of facts that would meet the criteria for
liability under LC. $6-904A(2). This Court has recently reaffirmed that "if liability is to be the rule
and immunity the exception," this language [in I.C. $6-904A(2)]should be given a construction that
avoids undoing section 6-904A's creation of a right to recover against the state for its negligen~e."~~
In addressing this issue, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that "Idaho courts have
rejected the 'the specific mechanism of injury' approach to foreseeability in favor of 'the general risk
of harm appr~ach."'~'Regardless of whether Idaho lias adopted the specific or general mecltanisln
of injury approach, that approach must not he so specific as to make liability not the rule hut
nonexistent. Determining that the School District was not reckless as a matter of law on the facts
here would make liability of a school district to its students nonexistent.

8g Sherer v. Pocatello School District No. 25, I43 Idaho 486, 492, 148 P.3d 1232, 1238
(2006) (Citations omitted)
90 Kunfz v. Lamar Corporation, 385 F.3d I 177, 1 I 86 (9"' Cir. 2004) (citing Orthman v. Idaho
Power Co., 130 Idaho 597,944 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1997)).

-
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F.

The School District Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees or Costs on Appeal
The School District seeks an award of attorneys fees on appeal alleging that the Stoddart's

appeal "was brought frivolously and without foundation, and [the Stoddarts] have failed to inake a
good faith argument for the extension ofexisting law."9' But, it is the School District's argument in
response to the Stoddarts' appeal that is frivolous and fails to make a good faith argument for
extension. According to the School District, "the question whether a school district owes a duty of
care to prevent foreseeable risks of harm to students off school property and/or school hours, has been
definitively answered in the negative."92 As discussed above, not only is the assertion that the duly
of a school district is limited by the place or time of the "injury" incorrect, the case cited by the
School District as support for this incorrect assertion, Rife v. Long, is the case in which this Court
explicitly so stated?) If an award of attorneys fees on appeal is awarded, that award should be made
to the Stoddarts.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Stoddarts respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the School District and award fees and costs to the Stoddarts
on appeal.

9'

School District BrieA p. 9.

92

School District BrieJ; p. 9 (ciling R@ v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846-47, 908 P.2d 143

(1995)).
93

See Section B above discussed Rjfi v. Long.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 34

DATED this

~of September,
' $2009.i ~
RACJNE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE &
BAILEY, CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

K\-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the A d a y of September, 2009, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Brian K. Julian
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP
P. 0. Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426

-

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF Page 35

[-$I
[
[
[

U. S. Mail
Postage Prepaid
] Hand Delivery
] Overnight Mail
] Facsimile

